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RUSSIA AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: WILL TRIPS BE A
STUMBLING BLOCK TO ACCESSION?*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPS”) codifies the international intellectual property
standards that are prerequisites to accession to the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO”).1  In the codification of these international stan-
dards, TRIPS provides unprecedented protection to intellectual
property rights; in fact, TRIPS is considered to be the most compre-
hensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property.2  The Rus-
sian Federation (“Russia”) is currently attempting to conform with
TRIPS in order to accede to the WTO.3
The aim of this Note is to examine whether Russia will be able to
fulfill its obligations to the extent necessary for WTO membership.
Although Russia may have facially conformed with many of the re-
quirements of TRIPS, its bid for WTO membership will be endan-
gered if it cannot demonstrate that its laws actually have force and
that Russia will effectively execute and enforce the intellectual prop-
erty regime set in place.
After outlining the structure of the WTO and its accession proc-
ess, this Note will discuss the international intellectual property
agreements before TRIPS, and the five major parts of TRIPS that of-
fer protection to intellectual property rights.  Russia’s conformance
with Parts I and II of TRIPS, the general provisions and substantive
standards of protection, will then be analyzed.  Russia’s conformance
with its key obstacle to accession, the legal enforcement of intellec-
tual property laws under Part III of TRIPS, will then be examined.
*The authors wish to thank Michael Newcity for his assistance with early versions of this Note.
1. See Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World
View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 393-94 (1996).
2. See id. at 391, 392; J.H. Reichman, Compliance with TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to
a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363, 366 (1996).
3. See generally Accession of the Russian Federation: Treatment of Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/ACC/RUS/7 (Oct. 25, 1995) (outlining Russia’s intellectual
property regime and its conformance to TRIPS) [hereinafter Russian Accession].
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Finally, this Note will conclude with a brief discussion on transitional
arrangements under Part VI of TRIPS and how these arrangements
will affect Russia’s conformance with TRIPS.
II.  THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
During the 1940s, John Maynard Keynes and other individuals
proposed the creation of the International Trade Organization
(“ITO”).4  An attempt to create the ITO failed, however, largely be-
cause of a lack of support in the Truman administration for the prin-
cipal agreement of the ITO, the Havana Charter.5  In 1947, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”) was drafted with the
intent that it would encompass a series of conferences under the
ITO.6  GATT 1947 was only a “provisional legal instrument” based
upon the Havana Charter;7 it was intended to be merely a transitional
document and to encompass only a “minimum institutional arrange-
ment”: the primary institution was to be the ITO.8
When the creation of the ITO failed, GATT 1947 surfaced as the
sole document encompassing international trade rules,9 and contin-
ued to govern the international trading system for nearly the next
fifty years.10  GATT developed gradually through a series of negotia-
tion rounds,11 and eventually became the “‘constitution’ for interna-
tional trade law.”12  The most recent GATT negotiation round, the
Uruguay Round, led to the creation of the WTO.13
The WTO was established on January 1, 1995 to encompass the
Uruguay Round results and to succeed GATT.14  While the WTO has
become the foundation of the multilateral trading system, 15 it did not
supercede GATT; instead, the results of the Uruguay Round sup-
4. See World Trade Organization, [1995/96] 1 Y.B. INT’L ORG. (Union of International
Associations) 1645.
5. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 85 (1996).
6. See id. at 86.
7. Id. at 85.
8. Frederique Berrod & Eric Gippini Fournier, The Common Institutional Framework of
the New World Trade System, in JACQUES H.J. BOURGEOIS ET AL., THE URUGUAY ROUND
RESULTS 25 (J.H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1995); see also World Trade Organization, supra note
4.
9. See World Trade Organization, supra note 4.
10. See BHALA, supra note 5, at 85-86.
11. See id. at 97.
12. Id. at 85.
13. See id. at 97.
14. See 1 WTO ANN. REP. 94 (1997); see also World Trade Organization, supra note 4.
15. See WTO ANN. REP., supra note 14.
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plement and enhance GATT 1947 and other pre-WTO trade instru-
ments.16  For example, while GATT provided protection only to trade
in goods, the WTO provides protection to trade in goods and serv-
ices, and to intellectual property rights.17  In addition, the WTO struc-
ture contemplates a “single undertaking” approach: WTO Members
must accept all of the results of the Uruguay Round.18
Many industrialized nations have joined the WTO, thereby be-
coming WTO “Members.”19  The WTO provides the framework for
contractual obligations between Members, and these obligations may
determine the confines of domestic trade policy.20  Essentially, the
WTO provides a forum in which Members may negotiate and address
issues arising under WTO agreements, and a supervisory mechanism
by which Members may enforce those agreements.21
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO Agreement”) is the central founding document of
the WTO.  The WTO Agreement establishes the WTO, and, inter
alia, delineates the Organization’s scope, functions, and structure.22
Parties who sign the WTO Agreement are also generally bound by
additional agreements called Multilateral Trade Agreements
(“MTAs”).23  The MTAs are comprised of three Annexes: (1) the
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, (2) the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(“Understanding”), and (3) the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.24
The three main parts of the first Annex are GATT 1994, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), and TRIPS.25
Membership in the WTO may be obtained by meeting the defi-
nition of an “original” Member, or by acceding to the WTO.26  To be
an original Member, there are four requirements: (1) the country
16. See BHALA, supra note 5, at 86; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994), art. 2(4), 16(1-2) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
17. See WTO ANN. REP., supra note 14.
18. World Trade Organization, supra note 4.
19. The signing parties to the WTO Agreements are referred to as Members.  See WTO
Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(1).
20. See WTO ANN. REP., supra note 14.
21. See WTO Agreement, supra note 16, art. 3(1-2).
22. See id. arts. 1-4.
23. See id. art. 2(2).
24. See id.
25. See id. Annex I.
26. See id. arts. 11 & 12.
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must have been a contracting party when the WTO Agreement came
into force; (2) the country must have accepted the WTO Agreement
and the MTAs; (3) the country must have annexed Schedules of Con-
cessions and Commitments to GATT 1994; and (4) the country must
have annexed Schedules of Specific Commitments to GATS.27  For
subsequent membership, the WTO Agreement provides that “[a]ny
state customs or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy
in the conduct of external commercial relations and of other matters
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between
it and the WTO.”28
There are four stages in the WTO accession process.  The first
stage involves the preliminary disclosure of information to WTO of-
ficials through a memorandum.29  During this stage, the applicant de-
scribes all aspects of its trade and economic policies that might affect
the WTO agreements.30  The applicant’s memorandum provides the
information that members of a WTO Working Party31 will closely
analyze.32
The second stage consists of bilateral accession negotiations,
which encompass “every aspect of the applicant’s trade policies and
practices, such as market access concessions and commitments on
goods and services, legislation to enforce intellectual property rights,
and all other measures which form a government’s commercial poli-
cies.”33  These bilateral negotiations constitute a considerable part of
the accession process and also determine the benefits that existing
WTO Members will accrue by allowing the applicant to accede.34
The third stage finalizes the negotiations and analysis of the ap-
plicant’s trade regime.35  During this stage, the Working Party com-
27. See id. art. 11(1).  In addition, there are special provisions for developing countries.
See id. art. 11(2).
28. Id. art. 12(1).
29. See Jeremy B. Rosen, China, Emerging Economies, and the World Trade Order, 46
DUKE L.J. 1519, 1523 n.29 (1997); e-mail correspondence between Christian L. Broadbent,
Editor-in-Chief Elect, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, and WTO Personnel
1 (Oct. 30, 1997) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
30. See Rosen, supra note 29; correspondence, supra note 29.
31. A WTO Working Party is established for governments when they apply to accede to
the WTO.  See WTO ANN. REP., supra note 14, at 95.
32. See Rosen, supra note 29; correspondence, supra note 29.
33. WTO ANN. REP., supra note 14, at 95; see also Rosen, supra note 29; correspondence,
supra note 29, at 1-2.
34. See correspondence, supra note 29, at 1-2.
35. See id. at 2.
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piles the information from its deliberations with the applicant and
completes a draft protocol of accession.36  The draft protocol may in-
clude several annexes, which are legally binding and address issues
particular to the applicant’s trade regime.37  In addition, the annexes
encompass timetables for the applicant’s conformance with WTO
obligations.38
The fourth stage involves the presentation of the draft protocol
and other negotiation documents to the General Council or Ministe-
rial Conference.39  If the Ministerial Conference then approves the
terms of the applicant’s accession by a two-thirds majority vote of
WTO Members,40 the applicant may sign the protocol and accede to
the WTO.41
The chronology and terms by which an applicant accedes are im-
portant aspects of the WTO accession negotiations.42  The length and
intensity of the negotiations will vary according to, and are highly de-
pendent on, the ability of the applicant to meet WTO rules and obli-
gations regarding free-market, pro-competition, and non-
discriminatory economic principles.43  Moreover, the conditions of the
applicant’s market access for goods and services granted to other
WTO Members play a decisive role in the accession process.44
III.  DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME: THE EMERGENCE OF TRIPS
A.  International Intellectual Property Law Before TRIPS
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, many countries pushed
for the adoption of TRIPS into the WTO framework.  However,
there was already an existing international regime that covered cer-
tain aspects of intellectual property.  TRIPS improved on this frame-
work by providing for protective measures and enforcement mecha-




39. See id. at 2-3; Rosen, supra note 29.
40. See Rosen, supra note 29; correspondence, supra note 29, at 3; see also WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 16, art. 12(2).
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1.  The Paris Convention.  The oldest intellectual property treaty,
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property45 sets
out standards and protections for “industrial property,” which
includes patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks,
service marks, trade names, and appellations of origin.46
Before TRIPS was implemented in 1995, the Paris Convention
was the primary source of international authority on trademarks and
service marks.47  Although the Convention set forth a number of pro-
visions on the registration and protection of trademarks, aspects of
the Convention are vague and enforcement provisions are weak.48
The Paris Convention, along with the Lisbon Agreement,49 was
also the primary source of governance for geographical indications.
Under the Convention, indications of source and appellations of ori-
gin are protected as geographical indications.50  While geographical
indications are protected under the Paris Convention as industrial
property, few provisions under the Convention offer any substantive
protection.51
Although not comprehensive in its treatment of patents, the
Paris Convention also established for a patent applicant the often vi-
tal right of priority for the purpose of filing subsequent applications
in other member countries.52
Additionally, until TRIPS was enacted the Paris Convention
45. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last re-
vised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
46. See id. art. 1(2).
47. Russia has assumed the treaty obligations of the Soviet Union regarding intellectual
property, which include the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement and the Protocol to the
Madrid Agreement.  The Russian government also recently signed on to the Trademark Law
Treaty in 1994.  See Cynthia V. Stewart, Trademarks in Russia: Making and Protecting Your
Mark, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 11-12 (1996).
48. Article 9, which outlines enforcement provisions for the seizure of goods bearing an
illegal trademark, has been interpreted as “watered down” as the convention does not bind
authorities to seize goods in transit, and does not require signatories to modify their laws to
allow seizure on importation of goods or prohibition of importation of goods illegally bearing a
trademark.  See Paris Convention, supra note 45, art. 9; see also Gerd F. Kunze, Trademarks, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
TRIPS AGREEMENT 29, 30 (Daphne Yong-d’Hervé et al. eds., 1996).
49. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin, Oct. 31, 1958, as re-
vised July 14, 1967 [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement].
50. See Kunze, supra note 48.
51. See id.
52. See Paris Convention, supra note 45, art. 4(1); see also Hans Jurgen Schulze-Steinen,
Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT 47, 47 (1996).
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contained the most significant provision of international law regard-
ing industrial designs.  Article 5quinquies53 gave members extraordi-
nary freedom in the organization of their design production and led
to a diverse range of national design production laws.54
2.  The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works.  The Berne Convention, along with its amendments,55
provides protection to literary and artistic works56 in a fairly
straightforward manner.  The Convention does not condition
protection of intellectual property upon meeting any formalities;
qualifying intellectual property is automatically protected under the
Convention.  Article 5 of the Convention grants national treatment
for Berne Union countries (Convention signatories).57  Under the
Convention, the basic rule is that the protection of copyrighted works
exists until fifty years after the death of the author.58
Although the Convention provides substantive protections to a
given author’s works,59 the Berne Convention does provide that
53. “Industrial designs shall be protected in all the countries of the Union.”  Paris Conven-
tion, supra note 45, art. 5quinquies.
54. See Tibor S. Pataky, Industrial Designs, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT 42, 42 (1996).
55. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  Officials
at the Uruguay Round negotiations agreed that TRIPS should expand and modify on the most
recent standards provided by the Convention in the Paris Act of 1971.  See Otten & Wager,
supra note 1, at 397.
56. The Berne Convention defines literary and artistic works as follows:
[E]very production in the literary, scientific, and artistic domain, whatever may be the
mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures,
addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-
musical works; choreographic works and entertainments [sic] in dumb show; musical
compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated
works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, paint-
ing architecture, sculpture, engraving, and lithography; photographic works to which
are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of ap-
plied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, topography, architecture or science.
Berne Convention, supra note 55, art. 2(1).  Article 2 also grants protection to the translations
of works (2(3)), establishes protection for a collection of works (2(5)), and allows Members to
require that the protected materials be fixed in some material form before they may receive
protection (2(2)).
57. See id. art. 5(1).  In addition, Article 3(1)(b) protects foreigners if they publish their
works within the Berne Union originally or simultaneously to publication outside the Union.
58. See id. art. 7.
59. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention delineates the extent of the control that authors
may have over their work, and contains provisions for the protection of the author’s moral
rights (droit moral).  In addition, Articles 8-14 provide the substance of the author’s rights.  For
example, the author has the right to control the translation (art. 8), reproduction (art. 9), and
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Members are authorized to make exceptions to the rules regarding
the rights of authorship, as long as the exceptions do not unreasona-
bly damage such rights.60  Conversely, Members may also provide for
higher levels of protection than those under the Berne Convention as
long as such enhanced protection does not conflict with any other
provisions of the Convention.61  The baseline of protection, however,
is a rebuttable presumption that the individual whose name appears
on an artistic or literary work shall be regarded as the author.62
3.  Other Relevant International Intellectual Property Agreements.
In addition to the Paris and Berne Conventions, a number of other
international agreements deal specifically with some of the
intellectual property covered by TRIPS.  For instance, other
international agreements that deal with copyrights and related rights
include the Universal Copyright Convention (1952),63 the Phonogram
Convention (1971),64 and the Rome Convention (1961).65  While
TRIPS does not require that Members abide by specific provisions of
the Rome Convention, it does state that nothing in Parts I to IV of
TRIPS shall derogate from existing obligations that Members have to
each other under the Rome Convention.66
Other international agreements dealing with trademarks include
public distribution of his copyrighted works (arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter), as well as the modification
or arrangement of the work (art. 12); see also Stefan Bernhard, Copyright and Related Rights,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY
ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT 22, 23 (1996).
60. See Bernhard, supra note 59; see also Berne Convention, supra note 55, art. 9(2).
61. See Bernhard, supra note 59; see also Berne Convention, supra note 55, arts. 19
(concerning domestic legislation), 20 (concerning bilateral treaties).
62. See Berne Convention, supra note 55, art. 15.  When an infringement of copyrighted
works occurs, individuals may institute legal proceedings in the courts of other Members
against those who infringe the copyrighted work.  See id. art. 15(4); see also Bernhard, supra
note 59.
63. Universal Copyright Convention, opened for signature Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216
U.N.T.S. 133, as last revised July 24, 1971, 55 U.S.T. 1341.
64. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms, done at Geneva, Switzerland, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309,
866 U.N.T.S. 67.
65. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, done at Rome, Italy, Oct. 26, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2377, 496
U.N.T.S. 43.
66. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 2(2)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
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the Madrid Agreement (1891),67 the Protocol to the Madrid Agree-
ment (1989),68 the Nice Agreement (1957),69 and the Vienna Agree-
ment.70  In addition, the Trademark Law Treaty71 was concluded in
1994, and is important in that it (1) obliges contracting parties to pro-
vide for registration of service marks, and (2) declares that all provi-
sions of the Paris Convention relating to trademarks shall also relate
to service marks.72
Concluded in 1958, the Lisbon Agreement protects appellations
of origin.73  While the Agreement affords unlimited registration of
geographic indications, appellations of origin must be registered with
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”),74 as well as
recognized and protected in the country of origin.75  Once registered
with the WIPO, such appellations are protected against usurpation or
67. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
828 U.N.T.S. 389.
The Madrid Agreement . . . allows international registration of a trademark or service
mark based on a home registration for a renewable 20-year period, with extension of
protection to up to 40 countries.  The countries concerned treat the international reg-
istration as a national trademark application to be examined on absolute and/or rela-
tive grounds for refusal.
Kunze, supra note 48, at 31.
68. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks, adopted June 27, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E).  The Madrid Protocol, which came
into effect in 1995, introduces certain changes which allow countries such as the United King-
dom and Northern European countries, which had no difficulties with some features of the Ma-
drid agreement, to adhere to the Madrid system without altering their basic features.  See
Kunze, supra note 48, at 31.
69. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services to
Which Trademarks are Applied, June 15, 1957, 23 U.S.T. 1336, 550 U.N.T.S. 45. “[T]he Nice
Agreement (1957) . . . establishes a list of 34 classes of goods and 8 classes of services . . . indi-
cating the class in which each good or service is classified.”  Kunze, supra note 48, at 31.
70. Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the Figurative Ele-
ments of Marks, June 12, 1973, as amended Oct. 1, 1985, T.C. Resmi Gazete No. 22373, at 12.24
(1995).
71. Trademark Law Treaty (adopted at Geneva on Oct. 27, 1994), in WIPO, Industrial
Property and Copyright, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, Jan. 1995, at 1-12.
72. See Kunze, supra note 48, at 31.
73. See id. at 35.  Appellations of origin are “the geographical name of a country, region,
or locality which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and characteris-
tics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including natu-
ral and human factors.”  Lisbon Agreement, supra note 49, art. 20.
74. WIPO is the U.N. organization charged with “the promotion of the protection of in-
tellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States, and for the ad-
ministration of various multilateral treaties dealing with the legal and administrative aspects of
intellectual property.”  What is WIPO? (last visited May 15, 1998)
<http://www/wipo/org/eng/dgtext.htm>.
75. See Lisbon Agreement, supra note 49.
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imitation.76
In addition to the Paris Convention and Lisbon Agreement,
which both deal with appellations of origin, the Madrid Agreement
on the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on
Goods (1891) deals with procedural issues and outlines enforcement
of intellectual property rights, including the seizure of importation of
any products with false and deceptive indications.77  Bilateral agree-
ments have also been important in the protection of geographical in-
dications.78  Finally, the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits79 provided the international standard prior to the
enactment of TRIPS.
B.  TRIPS
The Uruguay Round brought intellectual property into the
GATT-WTO system for the first time through TRIPS,80 which is a
significant component of the tripartite foundation upon which the
WTO is established.81  While there have been other attempts to cre-
ate international standards for intellectual property protection,
TRIPS strengthens and enlarges the scope of earlier accords such as
the Berne and Paris Conventions.82
While TRIPS establishes only the minimum protection that
Members must give to intellectual property rights,83 the scope of
TRIPS is comprehensive: the Agreement encompasses both general
and specific intellectual property rights.  The protection that TRIPS
affords to these rights are contained in five parts of the Agreement.
First, Part I of TRIPS addresses the general provisions and basic
principles of the Agreement.  TRIPS provides that while Members
76. See id.  The Lisbon Agreement affords this protection to registered appellations even
if the actual origin is cited, the appellation is used only in a translated form, or is qualified by
terms such as “kind” or “type.”  The Lisbon Agreement also protects against the classification
of an appellation as “generic,” as long as the country of origin still protects the appellation.  See
id.
77. See id. at 35.
78. See id.
79. Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 28 I.L.M. 1477
(1989).
80. See RT. HON. DENZIL DAVIES, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND GATT ‘94:
A GUIDE TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 10 (1995).
81. See Otten & Wager, supra note 1, at 391, 393.  Otten and Wager argue that the other
two important components that form the base of the WTO are trade in goods and trade in
services.  See id.
82. See BHALA, supra note 5, at 991-92.
83. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 1(1); WTO Ann. Rep., supra note 14, at 124.
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must give effect to the provisions of the Agreement, they may pro-
vide more extensive protection than the TRIPS provisions mandate
as long as such protection does not contravene TRIPS in any way.84
In addition, as long as Members adhere to the minimum require-
ments in TRIPS, they may determine the appropriate methods to im-
plement the Agreement within their own legal system and practice.85
Part I of the Agreement does affirmatively require, however, that
Members abide by many of the obligations of the Paris Convention,86
and states that TRIPS does not derogate from the Members’ existing
obligations under other major intellectual property accords.87  Part I
also generally requires Members to grant national88 and most-
favored-nation treatment89 to the nationals of other Members, and
provides that Members should implement TRIPS according to the
Agreement’s objectives90 and principles.91
Second, Part II of TRIPS provides the substantive standards of
protection for seven categories of intellectual property.  These cate-
84. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art 1(1).
85. See id.
86. See Otten & Wager, supra note 1, at 396-97; discussion infra Part III.C.1.
87. See TRIPS, supra note 66.  In general, it is argued that TRIPS attempts to make the
application of these agreements more effective.  See, e.g., Otten & Wager, supra note 1, at 397.
88. National treatment under TRIPS requires that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the na-
tionals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection of intellectual property. . . .”  TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 3(1)
(footnote omitted).  However, TRIPS provides exceptions to this requirement for, inter alia,
provisions in the Berne, Paris and Rome Conventions, and for performers, producers of pho-
nograms, and broadcasting organizations.  See id. art. 3(1-2).
89. Most-favored-nation treatment under TRIPS requires that “with regard to the protec-
tion of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Mem-
ber to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the nationals of all other Members.”  Id. art. 4.  TRIPS does provide exceptions to this treat-
ment for advantages, favors, privileges or immunities which a Member accords under the fol-
lowing circumstances: (1) pursuant to certain international agreements, (2) pursuant to certain
provisions of the Berne or Paris Conventions, and (3) pursuant to certain rights of performers,
producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations.  See id. art. 4(a)-(d).
90. TRIPS requires that Members should protect and enforce intellectual property rights
in ways that “contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of
rights and obligations.”  Id. art. 7.
91. To avoid legal measures which abuse intellectual property rights or restrict interna-
tional trade and the dissemination of technology, TRIPS allows Members to amend or formu-
late their laws according to certain principles.  See id. art. 8(2).  Specifically, TRIPS allows
Members to tailor laws and regulations in a manner which protects public health and nutrition,
and to promote the public interest, so long as the measures do not contravene TRIPS.  See id.
art. 8(1).
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gories include the following: copyright and related rights; trademarks
(and service marks); geographical indications; industrial designs; pat-
ents, layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits (e.g., micro-
chips); and undisclosed information (including trade secrets).92  In
addition, Part II of TRIPS contains provisions addressing anti-
competitive practices in contractual licenses, a category generally not
included in the definition of intellectual property.93  Experts note that
TRIPS provides protection to each of these categories by requiring
Members to abide by several important sections of the Berne and
Paris Conventions,94 and by enhancing the protection provided in
these previous intellectual property agreements.95  It is generally
thought that TRIPS standards are similar to those in industrialized
countries.96
Third, Part III of TRIPS outlines the provisions that Members
must follow to enforce intellectual property rights.  According to the
TRIPS enforcement provisions, Members must adhere to general ob-
ligations such as ensuring effective enforcement97 and fair and equi-
table procedures.98  The Agreement also outlines the civil and ad-
ministrative remedies that Members must provide, including
injunctions,99 damages,100 and under certain circumstances, the re-
moval from commerce or destruction of the infringing goods.101  Part
III also contains enforcement provisions regarding provisional meas-
ures,102 special requirements related to border measures,103 and crimi-
92. See id. Part II.
93. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 363, 367; see also TRIPS, supra note 66, Part II.
94. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
95. See Otten & Wager, supra note 1, at 396-97.
96. See, e.g., id. at 396.
97. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 41(1).
98. See id. art. 41(2).
99. See id. art. 44.
100. See id. art. 45.
101. See id. art. 46.
102. Article 50 of TRIPS addresses the judicial authority and procedures that Members
must follow in respect to provisional measures.  For example, TRIPS requires that Members
grant judicial authorities with the ability to order prompt and effective provisional measures to
prevent an infringement or to prevent certain goods from entering commerce and to preserve
evidence of an infringement.  See id. art. 50(1).  Article 50 also requires that judicial authorities
have the ability to adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte in appropriate situations,
that applicants provide evidence that they are the right holders and their rights are being in-
fringed (or will be infringed), and that applicants provide security or other assurance to protect
the alleged infringer.  See id. art. 50(2-3).  In addition, Article 50 contains provisions regarding
the procedural aspects of adopting measures inaudita altera parte, the information that that ap-
plicant must supply, the revocation of provisional measures, and the payment of compensation
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nal procedures.104
Fourth, Part V of TRIPS provides the parameters of dispute
resolution and settlement.  TRIPS requires that Members publish or
otherwise make available laws, regulations, and certain other legal
documents,105 and generally disclose information regarding its com-
pliance with transparency requirements to requesting Members.106
Also, Members must usually “notify [their] laws” and regulations to
the WTO Council for TRIPS, so that the Council may “review . . . the
operation of TRIPS.”107  In addition, Part V outlines how Members
shall utilize certain sections of GATT 1994 and the Understanding108
during consultations and disputes arising under TRIPS,109 and how
the Council for TRIPS shall handle complaints.110  Members risk the
loss of certain benefits and other adverse consequences if they fail to
adhere to their obligations under TRIPS.111
Fifth, Part VI of TRIPS explains how Members may apply cer-
tain transitional arrangements.  The TRIPS transitional arrangements
provide a grace period and grant exceptions to the applicability of
to a defendant when a court revokes the provisional measures or the measures lapse.  See id.
art. 50(4-7).
103. Part III, Section 4 of TRIPS contains several articles regarding special requirements
related to border measures: suspension of release by customs authorities (art. 51); applications
(for the customs authorities to take actions against infringement) (art. 52); security or equiva-
lent assurance (art. 53); notice of suspension (art. 54); duration of suspension (art. 55); indemni-
fication of the importer and the owner of the goods (art. 56); right of inspection and informa-
tion (art. 57); ex officio action (art. 58); remedies (art. 59); and de minimis imports (art. 60).
104. Part III, Section 5 of TRIPS addresses criminal procedures relating to intellectual
property infringement.  Article 61 states the following:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in
cases of wilful [sic] trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale.  Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient
to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a
corresponding gravity.  In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the
seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and
implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence.
Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are
committed wilfully [sic] and on a commercial scale.
105. See id. art. 63(1).
106. See id. art. 63(3)(4).
107. Id. art. 63(2).
108.  The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes is
found in Annex II to the MTAs.
109. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 64(1-2).
110. See id. art. 64(3).
111. See Otten & Wager, supra note 1, at 394.  For example, Otten & Wager state the fol-
lowing: “Under the WTO, the failure of a country to meet its TRIPS obligations can put its
market access rights and other benefits in jeopardy.”  Id.
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TRIPS to certain Members.  For example, under certain circum-
stances, TRIPS allows developing country Members and Members
which are transforming their economies from centrally-planned to
market-oriented economies more time in which to adhere to TRIPS
provisions.112  TRIPS also grants special exceptions for least-
developed country Members,113 and may require Members to provide
technical and financial cooperation to developing and least-
developed country Members.114
Besides the five major parts of TRIPS which protect intellectual
property rights, the origin of TRIPS also provides important insights
into the scope of protection under the Agreement.  Industrialized
countries such as the United States were strong catalysts for TRIPS,
as proprietors in these countries were losing substantial profits to
foreign producers who infringed intellectual property rights.115  For
this reason, it is argued that TRIPS is not necessarily designed to pro-
tect intellectual property rights, but instead is an attempt to balance
industrial concerns against the need to make information available.116
Thus, States with high piracy rates, such as Russia,117 might experi-
ence difficulty in gaining the approval of industrialized Members
112. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 65(1-4).
113. Article 66 of TRIPS states the following:
In view of their special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members,
their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility
to create a viable technological base, such Members shall not be required to apply the
provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4, [and] 5, for a period of 10 years
from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 65.  The Council
for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country Member,
accord extensions of this period. . . .  Developed country Members shall provide in-
centives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting
and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to
enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.
Id. art 66(1-2).
114. Article 67 of TRIPS provides the following:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country Mem-
bers shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical
and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country Mem-
bers.  Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regula-
tions on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on
the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or
reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including
the training of personnel.
115. See BHALA, supra note 5, at 979; see also Otten & Wager, supra note 1, at 393.
116. See BHALA, supra note 5, at 980.
117. In 1994, the piracy rate in Russia was seventy-nine percent.  See Eric H. Smith,
Worldwide Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 559, 570
(1996).  U.S. trade losses incurred in 1994 due to piracy in Russia are estimated to be a total of
$805 million.  See id. at 565.  Such trade losses are the largest in central and eastern Europe.
See id. at 564-65.
MCBROAD8.MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:59 PM
1998] TRIPS AND RUSSIAN ACCESSION TO THE WTO 533
during WTO negotiations.
C.  The TRIPS Era: Russia Attempts to Conform to the Letter of the
Law
In 1994, Russia applied for WTO membership,118 but the WTO
has granted it only WTO Observer Government status.119  There is
evidence that Russia may still be in the intermediate stages of the
WTO accession process, because as late as July 1997, the members of
Russia’s Working Party were still examining Russia’s legislative de-
velopments, support mechanisms for agriculture, trade regime, and
current and proposed laws regarding the enforcement of intellectual
property rights.120  As WTO Chairman William Rossier had proposed,
however, the Working Party was attempting to complete detailed ex-
aminations of Russia’s trade regime, issue a draft report by the end of
1997, and move toward bilateral negotiations.121  By the beginning of
1998, Russia was engaged in consultations with WTO Members, who
have made demands for intellectual property reforms in Russia.122
Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton have targeted 1998 as the year in
which Russia will join the WTO.123  Despite such ambitious inten-
tions,124 Russian analysts remain skeptical about their country’s abil-
ity to sufficiently modify its legislation and make other requisite
changes before the end of 1998.125  Aside from the daunting prospect
of getting market-based legislation through a communist-dominated
Duma, there is speculation that the speed at which Russia’s economy
is changing and Moscow’s ties with the former Soviet republics may
118. See Talks on Russia’s Accession to World Trade Organization, ITAR-TASS News
Agency, Apr. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
119. See Jim Kennett, Russia Seeks Fair Play for WTO Entry, MOSCOW TIMES, June 9,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
120. See correspondence, supra note 29, at 4-5; Stephanie Baker-Said, EU Official in Mos-
cow to Discuss WTO, Trade, MOSCOW TIMES, June 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Mostms File; Irina Bolshova, Russia-WTO Talks to Resume Later This Week, ITAR-
TASS News Agency, May 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
121. See correspondence, supra note 29, at 5.
122. See Sergei Mingazhev, Russo-Japanese Consultations Held in Moscow, ITAR-TASS
News Agency, Mar. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; see also Sergei
Mingazhev, Japan Satisfied with Results of Talks with Russia on WTO, ITAR-TASS News
Agency, Mar. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
123. See Stephanie Baker-Said, Russia’s Bid for WTO in ‘98 Looks Slim, MOSCOW TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File [hereinafter Baker-Said, Rus-
sia’s Bid for WTO]; Baker-Said, supra note 120.
124. See Ian MacWilliam, Summit Set to Target Trade, EU Expansion, MOSCOW TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
125. See Baker-Said, Russia’s Bid for WTO, supra note 123.
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be retarding Russia’s progress toward WTO accession.126
In addition, there is evidence that Russia is experiencing diffi-
culty during accession negotiations because of its weak enforcement
of intellectual property rights.  For example, the United States and
the European Union have already demanded that Russia more effec-
tively enforce such rights.127  In response to these demands and to
heightened scrutiny of Russia’s intellectual property regime, Russian
officials openly admit to struggling with ineffective protection of in-
tellectual property rights; they vow, however, to make efforts to im-
prove.128  As previously mentioned, the progress of accession negotia-
tions depends on a country’s readiness to meet the WTO rules,
obligations, and underlying principles.  It seems unlikely, therefore,
given Russia’s current state of enforcement of intellectual property
rights, that Russian officials will be able to convince WTO Members
that they are able to protect the rights outlined in TRIPS.
Under the Russian Constitution, which was passed into law in
1993, “Generally recognized principles and norms of international
law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation are a
constituent part of its legal system.  If an international treaty of the
Russian Federation establishes these rules other than those stipulated
by law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.”129  As such,
the TRIPS regime adopted by Russia in many ways would supplant
the heretofore existing legal regime.  Some notable gaps in the re-
sulting regime still exist, however, particularly regarding implementa-
tion and enforcement.
While any difficulties that these gaps might entail and the details
regarding Russia’s accession to the WTO are left to negotiations,130 it
is important to identify the potential problem areas for Russia.  To
delineate these areas, an analysis of Russia’s conformance with
TRIPS is particularly instructive.
126. See id.
127. See Vladimir Krivosheyev, MVES Head Mikhail Fradkov: By Joining WTO Russia
Upholder [sic] Her Interests, RUSSICA Info. Inc. RusData DiaLine- BizEkon News, Jan. 26,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
128. See Gannady Yezhov, Chernomyrdin Meets Business People of US West Coast, ITAR-
TASS News Agency, June 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
129. Constitution of the Russian Federation, art. 15(4), in RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS
LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 7 (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1998) [hereinafter Russian
Const.].
130. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 12(1).
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1.  General Provisions and Basic Principles.  An important part
of TRIPS is its interactive relationship with other intellectual
property accords such as the Berne and Paris Conventions.  In fact,
Part I of TRIPS requires Members to comply with Articles 1-12 and
19 of the Paris Convention, and states that TRIPS will not derogate
from the obligations that Members have under the Paris, Berne, and
Rome Conventions, and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits.131  Russia is already a party to the
Berne and Paris Conventions,132 and therefore meets TRIPS
requirements in this respect.
In addition, it does not appear that the national and most-
favored-nation treatment requirements in TRIPS will present a
problem for Russia.  For example, Russia already grants national
treatment to the nationals and legal entities of parties to the Berne,
Paris, and Universal Copyright Conventions.133  Moreover, Russian
law allows national treatment both through its Constitution,134 which
“provides for the direct application and prevalence of international
agreements,”135 and through its intellectual property legislation.  Rus-
sian officials have noted that when Russia accedes to the WTO, the
legal entities and nationals of other Members will then be granted na-
tional and most-favored-nation treatment. 136
2.  Substantive Standards of Protection.  For the most part, it
appears that Russian intellectual property laws provide a sufficient
standard of protection to the rights outlined in TRIPS.  However,
there are some potential problem areas for Russia, and an analysis of
each category of intellectual property protected under TRIPS, and
anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses, is provided below.
(a)  Copyrights.  President Yeltsin signed the Law of the Russian
Federation On Copyright and Neighboring Rights (“Copyright Act”)
on July 9, 1993, and the Law became effective on August 3, 1993.137
131. See id. art. 2(1), (2).
132. See Russian Accession, supra note 3, at 2.
133. See id. at 2-3.
134. See Russian Const., supra note 129.
135. Russian Accession, supra note 3, at 2.
136. See id. at 3.
137. RF Copyright Act, RF Act No, 5351-1; RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 5351-1/1-1; RF
Supreme Soviet Decree No. 5352-1, July 9, 1992, in BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF
RUSSIA: TRANSLATIONS WITH EXPERT COMMENTARY 9-79 (Russica Information, Inc. trans.;
John P. Hupp ed., 1994) [hereinafter Copyright Act]; see also Michiel Elst, The Rehabilitation
of Copyright in the Russian Federation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE RUSSIAN
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Simultaneously, the Russian government abolished the copyright
provisions of the Fundamentals of Civil Litigation of the USSR and
the Republics of May 31, 1991 (“1991 Fundamentals”), which had
governed copyrights in Russia following the collapse of the USSR.138
The adoption of the Copyright Act allowed Russia to accede to
the Berne Convention,139 and is considered to be more effective than
the 1991 Fundamentals, because the 1991 Fundamentals contained
only the “basic provisions that were then to be incorporated in more
detailed enactments . . . [and the] copyright provisions were by their
nature too vague to provide a satisfactory basis for the enforcement
of author’s rights.”140
Experts note that the Copyright Act, the Law on the Legal Pro-
tection of Programs for Computers and Databases, and any subse-
quent legislation encompass the legal copyright protection in Rus-
sia.141  With the major exception of enforcement,142 Russian copyright
law does not appear to significantly diverge from the TRIPS Agree-
ment.
In fact, Russia meets the copyright protection required by
TRIPS in four main ways: first, Russian law appears to provide ade-
quate protection according to Article 10 of TRIPS, which protects
computer programs and compilations of data;143 second, Russian law
meets the Article 11 TRIPS provision regarding rental rights to
authors and successors;144 third, Russian law meets the terms of pro-
tection required by TRIPS;145 and fourth, Russian law protects the
rights of performers and producers of phonograms and broadcasting
organizations as required under TRIPS.146
(b)  Trademarks.  The Russian Federation Trademarks, Brand
Names and Country of Origin Act (“Trademarks Act”) clearly
emphasizes its conformity with international law.  The Act states in
FEDERATION:  A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 129, 129 (Michiel Elst & Katlijn Malfliet eds., 1994).
138. See Michael Newcity, Russian Intellectual Property Reform: Towards a Market Para-
digm, 36 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 328, 361 (1993).
139. See Monica B. Vermeer, A New Era in Russian Copyright Law: Protecting Computer
Software in the Post-Soviet Russian Federation, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 165
(1995).
140. Newcity, supra note 138, at 359.
141. See, e.g., id.
142. See discussion infra Part IV.
143. See Russian Accession, supra note 3, at 3-4.
144. See id. at 5.
145. See id. at 6.
146. See id. at 7.
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its final article that “if other rules have been established by an
international treaty of the Russian Federation than those which are
contained in the present Law, the rules of the international treaty
shall apply.”147
In some instances, the Trademarks Act is even broader than
TRIPS.  For example, the Act also provides for the creation of a
“collective mark,” which may be jointly owned (but not transferable)
by a union or group of enterprises.148
There are, however, some issues that may hamper Russia’s com-
plete compliance with TRIPS (and therefore its bid for WTO mem-
bership).  As applications for trademarks have risen 500-600% within
the last decade, it can take as long as three years for the State Patent
Agency to approve a trademark application.149  This may be problem-
atic for potential trademark owners, whose initial term of ownership,
if granted, begins on the date on which the application was filed.
Such a problem is ameliorated in part by the ability of a trademark
owner to request additional ten-year periods of ownership.150  An-
other potential legal flaw with the current Russian law is that unless a
mark qualifies as “notorious,” non-registered prior users are unpro-
tected and trademarks are issued in accordance with a “first-come,
first-served” basis.151
When a dispute arises regarding registration or invalidation of a
trademark, an individual now has not only the Rospatent’s Chamber
of Patent Appeals, but can also turn to the new Supreme Patent
Chamber152 to handle certain disputes.  However, this benefit has not
yet been realized by trademark owners, as the implementing legisla-
tion creating the Supreme Chamber has yet to be passed.153  The re-
cent Smirnoff case also established that trademark owners can turn to
the judiciary as well as the administrative appeals process.154  The
147. Trademarks, Brand Names and Country of Origin Act, RF Act No, 3520-1; RF Su-
preme Soviet Decree No. 3521-1; RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3522, Sept. 23, 1992, art. 48,
in BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA: TRANSLATIONS WITH EXPERT COM-
MENTARY 9-53 (Russica Information, Inc. trans.; John P. Hupp ed., 1993) [hereinafter Trade-
marks Act].
148. See id. art. 20.
149. See Stewart, supra note 47, at 9.
150. See Newcity, supra note 138, at 350.
151. See Trademarks Act, supra note 147, art. 9.
152. See id. at art. 45(2) (stating that the Supreme Chamber of Patents will hear disputes in
conformity with Articles 3, 21, 22, 28, 29, 34, and 42 of the Act).
153. See Stewart, supra note 47, at 9.
154. Id. at 9-10.
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government also needs to shorten the waiting period for approval of
trademark registration applications by the Rospatent office, whether
by increased funding or by other means.
(c)  Geographical Indications.  Russian law provides protection
to geographical indications in two primary ways: (1) protecting
against unfair competition, and (2) controlling the registration of
geographical indications.155  First, the Russian Federation Law on
Competition and Limiting Monopolistic Activities on Commodity
Markets (“Anti-Monopoly Law”) broadly protects geographical
indications by prohibiting the use of information that “mislead[s]
consumers concerning the character, mode, and place of
manufacture, consumer properties, and quality of products.”156
Second, false or misleading geographical indications may not be
registered under the Trademarks Act,157 and the registration may
later be declared null and void.158
TRIPS defines geographic indications as “indications which
identify a good as originating in the territory of the Member, or a re-
gion or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geo-
graphic origin.”159  There is some evidence that the protection for
geographic indications under Russian law may not be as broad as that
provided by TRIPS: the Trademarks Act explicitly protects only one
category of geographical indications, appellations of origin, while ex-
cluding another category, (simple) indications of source.160  However,
155. See Russian Accession, supra note 3, at 9.
156. Law on Competition and Limiting Monopolistic Activities on Commodity Markets of
March 22, 1991, amended on May 25, 1995, art. 10 [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law] (on file
with authors).
157. See Russian Accession, supra note 3, at 11
158. See Trademarks Act, supra note 147, art. 42(1-2).
159. TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 22(1).
160. The Trademarks Act designates the place of origin of goods as the following:
Designation of place of origin of goods shall be the title of the country, populated lo-
cality, area or other geographic object . . . used to denominate goods whose specific
properties are exclusively or mainly determined by the natural conditions or human
factors, or natural conditions and human factors simultaneously, as being characteris-
tic of the given geographic object. . . .
Trademarks Act, supra note 147, art. 30(1).  Commentators thus note that Russian law excludes
a second subcategory of geographic indications, namely (simple) indications of source.  See
Adolf Dietz, The New Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Appellations of Origin of the
Russian Federation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 198 (Michiel
Elst & Katlijn Malfliet eds., 1994).  (Simple) indications of source are defined as “any denomi-
nation, expression or sign indicating that a product or service originated in a geographic area
without the product or service being determined by special natural and/or human factors.”  Id.
MCBROAD8.MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:59 PM
1998] TRIPS AND RUSSIAN ACCESSION TO THE WTO 539
Russia is a party to the Paris Convention, which offers a broad scope
of protection to geographical indications, and protects both indica-
tions of source and appellations of origin as industrial property.161
However, Russian law may be insufficient in furnishing the en-
hanced protection provided by TRIPS to geographical indications for
wines and spirits.  Beyond the protection that WTO Members must
provide for geographical indications, Members must grant additional
protection to indications of wines and spirits162—including homony-
mous indications for wines163—and must refuse or invalidate the regis-
tration of certain indications for such products.164  It is important to
note, however, that TRIPS grants special leeway regarding geo-
graphic indications in this area, and the issues pertaining to the pro-
tection of indications will be addressed during negotiations.165
(d)  Industrial Designs.  After a troubled and spotty history of
providing, then refusing, legal protection for industrial designs,166
Russian law on industrial designs now comports with TRIPS and the
Paris Convention. The confusing standard of “independently
created” under TRIPS may only serve to reemphasize that no
imitations are allowed under this category, but its interpretation in
the Russian context is unclear.  One problem, however, is due to the
fact that Soviet patents and other documents protecting industrial
property (such as certificates) are still recognized.167  This in part
at 198.
161. See discussion supra Part III.A.1; Paris Convention, supra note 45, art. 1(2).  However,
note the criticisms of the Paris Convention in the same discussion.
162. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 23(1).
163. See id. art. 23(3).
164. See id. art. 23(2).
165. TRIPS provides that Members agree to negotiate regarding the protection of geo-
graphical indications for wines and spirits.  See id. art. 24(1).  TRIPS also provides special pro-
visions for the following circumstances: (1) the use of geographic indications continuously or in
good faith; (2) the use or registration of, or the application for a trademark in good faith; (3)
the use of indications which are identical with another Member’s terms or customary names for
goods and services; and (4) the use of a person’s name.  See id. art. 24(4), (6), (8).  In addition,
Members are not obliged to protect geographical indications which in the country of origin (1)
are not protected, (2) cease to be protected, or (3) have fallen into disuse.  See id. art. 24(9).
166. See generally Eduard P. Gavrilov, The Legal Protection of Industrial Designs, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
TRIPS AGREEMENT 85-98 (1996).
167. See RF Supreme Soviet Decree Enacting the RF Patent Law, No. 3518-2, Sept. 23,
1992, at clause (3).  The RF Government has tackled the problem in part by allowing use of
inventions and industrial designs protected under the Soviet regime in return for compensation
for such use.  See Use of Inventions and Industrial Design Protected by Author’s Certificates of
Invention and Certificates of Industrial Design in Effect on RF Territory and Payment of
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leaves in place two separate (and inconsistent) legal regimes for
recognizing industrial designs.
(e)  Patents.  The Russian Federation Law of Patents Act
(“Patents Act”) protects industrial property consisting of inventions,
industrial designs and utility models.168  Although the new Patents
Act is a substantial improvement over the Soviet legal regime,
problems from the old system still persist and may interfere with
effective implementation of TRIPS.  During the Soviet era, entities of
the government could lawfully exploit many patents because patents
held a “semi-public domain” status.169  As a result of the shift from a
centralized to a market economy, and “the recent privatization of
state enterprises and R & D institutes, it is currently unclear who
holds patent rights to the inventions that formerly belonged to the
state-owned enterprises.”170  The lack of proper enforcement
mechanisms may also prove to be a problem in the realm of patents,
as Article 32 of TRIPS specifically provides that “[a]n opportunity
for judicial review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent shall
be available.”171  The slow approval process outlined in Article 21 of
the Patents Act will also frustrate efforts to register patents in
Russia.172
(f)  Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits.  Russia has essentially
adopted the language of TRIPS regarding integrated circuits.  Under
TRIPS, the term of protection for rights holders is extended to ten
years from the filing date of the application.173  Article 37 of the
Agreement grants immunity to an individual although he or she
performed an unlawful act (under Article 36) if “the person
performing or ordering such acts did not know and had no reasonable
Compensation to Authors, RF Government Decree No. 648, July 12, 1993, art 1.
168. RF Law of Patents Act, RF Act No. 3517-1; RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3518-1
and No. 3519-1, Sept. 23, 1992, art. 1 [hereinafter Patents Act].  For legislation establishing the
agencies and agents responsible for overseeing effective implementation of the Patents Act, see
Statute of the RF Committee on Patents and Trademarks, RF President’s Edict No. 223, Feb.
12, 1993; Statute of Patent Agents, RF Government Decree No. 122, Feb. 12, 1993.
169. Andrew A. Baev, Recent Changes In Russian Intellectual Property Law And Their Ef-
fect Upon The Protection Of Intellectual Property Rights In Russia, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 361, 366-67 (1996).
170. Id. at 369.
171. TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 32.
172. See Andrei Voitko, Commentary: Intellectual Property–Patents, in BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA § 9.03.5 9-37 (Russica Information, Inc. trans.; John P. Hupp
ed., 1996).
173. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 38.
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ground to know, when acquiring the integrated circuit or article
incorporating such an integrated circuit, that it incorporated an
unlawfully reproduced layout-design.”174  The Russian Federation
Law On Legal Protection of Topographies of Integrated Circuits
(“Integrated Circuit Act”)175 mirrors the language of Article 37 of
TRIPS.  Additionally, it adds the provision that compensation should
be remitted to the rightful holder for each integrated circuit or device
containing an integrated circuit.176
Prior to TRIPS, the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect
of Integrated Circuits provided the international standard.  Many
countries were dissatisfied with that treaty, however, and TRIPS ad-
dresses those concerns “with four additional provisions . . . relat[ing]
to the term of protection (ten years instead of eight), the treatment of
innocent infringers, the applicability of the protection to articles con-
taining infringing integrated circuits, and compulsory licensing.”177
(g)  Undisclosed Information.  The protection of undisclosed
information, such as trade secrets, is relatively new to Russia and the
former Soviet republics.  Experts note that trade secrets were not
even addressed in Russian legislation until they were introduced
during market-oriented reforms.178
The Russian Civil Code and Anti-Monopoly Law are the two
important sources of Russian law that address undisclosed informa-
tion.179  Article 139 of the Russian Civil Code addresses employment
and commercial secrets.  The language of the Civil Code generally
satisfies the TRIPS provisions on undisclosed information, with one
exception: TRIPS provides protection for undisclosed information
that is appropriated without the owner’s consent “in a manner that is
contrary to honest commercial practices”;180 the Civil Code, however,
174. Id. art. 37(1).
175. See generally Integrated Circuit Lay-Out Protection Act, RF Act No. 3526-1; RF Su-
preme Soviet Decree No. 3527-1; RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3528-1 (Sept. 23, 1992)
[hereinafter Integrated Circuit Act].  Specific rules in this area have also been included in the
1993 Copyright Act.
176. See id. art. 8(1).
177. Otten and Wager, supra note 1, at 401-02.
178. See Vera S. Shishkina, Protection of Trade Secrets and Know-How and the Unfair
Competition Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 209 (Michiel Elst & Katlijn Malfliet eds.,
1994).
179. See Russian Accession, supra note 3, at 20-21.
180. TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 39(2).  TRIPS defines a manner contrary to honest com-
mercial practices as “at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and in-
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provides for no such condition.  This deficiency may be compensated,
however, by the Anti-Monopoly Law.  The Anti-Monopoly Law pro-
vides that unfair competition shall not be allowed by “obtaining, us-
ing, or disclosing research, technical, producer or trading informa-
tion, including commercial secrets, without the owner’s consent.”181
This language in the Anti-Monopoly Law may indeed encompass the
honest commercial practices contemplated by TRIPS.
While the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Russian Civil Code may
be construed in pari materia to adequately protect rights regarding
undisclosed information, there is one facet of these rights under
TRIPS that neither the Anti-Monopoly Law nor the Russian Civil
Code protects.  TRIPS generally provides protection to undisclosed
test data and other data provided to the government for the purposes
of approving the marketing of certain pharmaceutical or chemical
products,182 while the Russian laws appear to offer no protection in
this area.
(h)  Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual
Licenses.  Many of the conditions a licensor may attach to an
intellectual property license may adversely affect international trade
and the dissemination of information.183  However, it is argued that
because such licensing problems are not adequately addressed by
domestic legislation and pre-TRIPS international agreements, it was
therefore “necessary to establish a basis for cooperation between the
member countries of the WTO to control practices.”184
The TRIPS provisions regarding anti-competitive practices in
contractual licenses differ from the protection that the Agreement
offers to the categories of intellectual property previously mentioned,
for TRIPS does not require any specific protection to contractual li-
censes.  Instead, TRIPS makes a general statement regarding con-
tractual licenses, and ensures that Members will enter into negotia-
tions when problems arise.185  The Agreement notes that “Members
ducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties
who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the
acquisition.”  Id. at n.10.
181. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 156.
182. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 39(3).
183. See id. art. 40(1); German Cavelier, Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contrac-
tual Licenses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT 62 (1996).
184. See Cavelier, supra note 183, at 62-63.
185. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 40.
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agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intel-
lectual property rights which restrain competition may have adverse
effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of
technology.”186
Instead of laying out the parameters for the protection against
anti-competitive practices, TRIPS allows Members considerable lati-
tude to determine which licensing practices abuse intellectual prop-
erty and will adversely affect competition, and to adopt measures to
address such practices.187  While TRIPS requires Members to enter
into negotiations with one another regarding alleged anti-competitive
practices in contractual licenses, these negotiations are largely based
on domestic law and other mutual agreements.188  Therefore, it does
not appear that the provisions regarding anti-competitive practices in
contractual licenses will present a substantial issue for Russia during
its accession negotiations.
While it seems clear that there are some problem areas for Rus-
sia in its substantive protection of intellectual property, the real
stumbling block is not likely to be gaps in the actual provisions; in-
stead, the central obstacle is Russia’s problem with enforcement of
intellectual property rights.  Indeed, the rate of piracy of intellectual
property rights in Russia remains very high.189  These high rates of pi-
racy are likely to be a barrier to successful negotiations during the
WTO accession process, because while Members want an applicant’s
legislation to provide protection similar to that in TRIPS, they also
consider effective enforcement to be a crucial matter.190  It is here that
Russia truly stumbles.  As Russia attempts to enforce its intellectual
property laws, it wrestles with a long history of lack of respect for in-
tellectual property protection—indeed, a lack of respect for the no-
tion of law itself.
186. Id. art. 40(1).
187. See id. art. 40(2).
188. See id. art. 40(3)(4).
189. See Smith, supra note 117.
190. E-mail correspondence between Christian L. Broadbent, Editor-in-Chief Elect, Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law, and WTO Personnel 1 (Mar. 30, 1998) (on file
with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
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IV.  ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
[T]he problem of enforcing the laws has become the stumbling block
for the implementation of the new standards of intellectual property
protection in Russia.191
While it appears that Russia may have some areas in which it
must implement more extensive intellectual property protection, it
does have laws in place which protect intellectual property rights to a
great extent.  What is missing, however, is effective enforcement.
The existence of effective enforcement in Russia is critical to the ef-
fective implementation of TRIPS, and thus to WTO membership.
The obligations placed on Members in TRIPS are vague but poten-
tially far-reaching.  Part III of the Agreement lays out the general
obligations for enforcing intellectual property rights, and also grants
member jurisdictions broad authority in the judicial resolution of in-
tellectual property protection.  Article 41 of the Agreement provides
the only obligatory enforcement language in Part III.192  Under Arti-
cle 41(1), “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit ef-
fective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious reme-
dies. . . .”193  The provision states that the goal of the procedures to be
adopted is to prevent the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.194
Part III of the Agreement is explored more fully below.
Under a loose interpretive standard, Russia could possibly slip
past significant problems with enforcing TRIPS.  For the most part,
Russia does facially provide mechanisms for judicial relief.  However,
will the Members of the WTO allow a poorly-operating judicial sys-
tem that cannot enforce its judgments to stand in the way of Russia’s
membership?  It is questionable whether a system that cannot en-
force its laws truly acknowledges the existence of those laws in the
first place.  Because Russia has formally implemented laws protecting
intellectual property rights, a major factor in whether it will comply
with TRIPS is whether the TRIPS standards of enforcement are im-
plemented in accordance with their letter and spirit.
191. Baev, supra note 169, at 365.
192. The rest of Part III is only obligatory in establishing the authority of the courts, not
actually in the enforcement of the courts’ decisions.
193. TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 41(1) (emphasis added).
194. See id.  The question here is what constitutes “effective action” and “expeditious
remedies.”
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Under Articles 65 and 66 of TRIPS, Russia does have additional
time to bring its enforcement procedures into compliance with
TRIPS provisions.  At this time, Russia has indicated that it will
waive the transitional arrangements when its membership bid comes
up for consideration.195  Current WTO Members have also indicated
that Russia may not be admitted as a Member unless it relinquishes
its right to take advantage of the transitional arrangements.  What
this means, in essence, is that Russia must be in adequate compliance
with TRIPS at that time.  Russia is therefore effectively working
within the grace period now to bring its intellectual property laws
into compliance by the end of the century.  It is uncertain whether
this will be enough time for Russia to meet TRIPS standards by culti-
vating stronger enforcement and making concomitant changes in spe-
cific areas where substantial improvement is needed.
A.  TRIPS Enforcement Requirements
Part III of TRIPS lays out the enforcement procedures that must
be followed by signatory States.  As stated above, Article 41 of the
Agreement houses the general obligations regarding enforcement.
Section Two of Part III covers civil and administrative remedies and
procedures.  Article 42 of the Agreement requires that Member
States provide a system of civil judicial procedures to enforce the
rights laid out in the Agreement.  Specifically, Article 42 requires
timely notice (which is sufficiently detailed), the right to representa-
tion by “independent” legal counsel, and that the court not be
“overly burdensome” when requiring personal appearances.  Courts
must also provide a forum in which parties may present all relevant
evidence and “provide a means to identify and protect confidential
information,” to the extent that such confidentiality would not con-
travene constitutional requirements.  Although much of the language
in Section Two is hortatory at best, it covers many topics, such as evi-
dence, injunctions, damages, and indemnification.
Section Three of Part III authorizes judicial authorities in Mem-
ber States to adopt provisional measures whenever such measures are
necessary (1) “to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property
right from occurring,” and (2) “to preserve relevant evidence in re-
gard to the alleged infringement.”196  Article 50(2) does authorize
195. See Russia Signs Trade Deal with EU, ITAR-TASS News Agency, July 17, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
196. TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 50(1)(a)-(b).
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courts to adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte, but when a
court does so it must give the affected parties notice of the measures
and must also allow the parties a chance to be heard to decide
whether the provisional measures adopted should be “modified, re-
voked or confirmed.”197  Although Article 50(4) states that the provi-
sional measures must be revoked if “proceeding[s] leading to a deci-
sion on the merits of the case” have not been initiated within a
“reasonable” amount of time,198 such wording is so broad and vague
that almost any de minimis action taken could constitute some sort of
“proceeding” that might eventually lead to a hearing of the merits of
a case.  Section Four of Part III authorizes Member States to take a
number of measures specifically aimed at preventing the importation
of pirated goods into a Member State.
Section Five of Part III requires Members to provide criminal
sanctions for, at the very least, cases involving “wilful [sic] trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale,”199 and also
requires that remedies be sufficient to “provide a deterrent consistent
with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding
gravity.”200
What seems to be a fairly comprehensive outline of civil, admin-
istrative, and criminal remedies may be severely limited by Article
41(5).201  Narrowly read, the provision merely states that Members
are not required to put in place a system of judicial enforcement en-
tirely distinct from that State’s already existing court system.  How-
ever, the language that emphasizes a Member State’s autonomy in
distributing resources between intellectual property enforcement and
general enforcement may have a significant impact in countries like
Russia where the government has limited resources to dedicate to en-
forcement of intellectual property laws.
197. Id. art. 50(4).
198. Id. art. 50(6).
199. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. Article 41 of TRIPS reads as follows:
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the en-
forcement of laws in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce
their laws in general.  Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the
distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and
the enforcement of laws in general.
TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 41(5).
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B.  Paper Versus Practice: Enforcement of “Available” Remedies
Under Russian Law
On paper at the very least, a number of remedies are available in
Russian law to those whose intellectual property rights have been in-
fringed.  However, many of these remedies are left effectively unen-
forceable to date, which may negate the value of having the laws in
the first place.  Following are the major remedies available under
Russian law and a few glaring examples of enforcement problems
Russians (and others) have faced.
In the area of copyright protection, non-authorized use of any
copyrighted work constitutes infringement.202  While Russian laws
allow owners of exclusive copyrights and related rights to resort to
the legal, arbitration, or mediation system203 and include legal reme-
dies for the violation of copyright laws,204 the application of such laws
has apparently been less than admirable.  In addition, some legal
remedy provisions are very broad and are open to significant subjec-
tive interpretation.  For example, Article 48 of Copyright Act states
that the infringement of any of the provisions of the Act will entail
civil, criminal, and administrative liability in conformance with the
laws of Russia.205  Despite such formidable wording, Article 48 does
not provide further explanation as to the magnitude of such liability
or what type of liability is to be incurred for which form of infringe-
ment.  The only further explanation is a statement in section two of
Article 48: “A natural or legal person that does not fulfill the re-
quirements of this Law shall be a violator of copyrights and neigh-
boring rights.”
Section Five of the Copyright Act also deems that the copies of
works and phonograms whose fabrication or distribution is an in-
fringement of a copyright or related right are pirated copies.206  Cop-
ies of works and phonograms that are protected under Russian law
via the Copyright Act and which are imported without the owner’s
consent from a country that does not protect such rights, are also pi-
rated copies under Russian law.207  A court of law or of arbitration
may order the confiscation or destruction of the pirated copies of a
202. See Alexander A. Christoporoff, Protection of Intellectual Property in Russia (visited
Nov. 10, 1997) <http://www.ruslaw.ru/intprop1.htm>.
203. See Copyright Act, supra note 137, art. 49(3).
204. See id. Section V.
205. See id. art. 48(1).
206. See id. art. 48(3)
207. See id. art. 48(4).
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work or phonogram, along with the materials and equipment used in
the fabrication of such works.208  While there is no special procedure
for customs actions,209 the plaintiff who is filing or has filed a com-
plaint may ask the court for the goods under customs control seizure
order.210  TRIPS does provide some specific guidance in that it man-
dates the adoption of procedures which allow right holders to peti-
tion for the suspension of release of goods from customs, when they
are reasonably suspected to be pirated copyright goods.211  However,
it too provides little by means of ensuring that such procedures will
actually be utilized in adjudication.
Russian law also entitles the owners themselves to make further
demands from the individuals whom the law deems to be violators.212
In addition to any amount that a Russian court awards to a plaintiff
in a copyright infringement suit, the court shall impose a fine of ten
percent of the total amount it awards in favor of the plaintiff.213
TRIPS introduces a two-tiered, intent-based system of damages into
this scheme.214
Russian courts may also order both permanent and preliminary
injunctions.215  Pursuant to these injunctions, courts may order that a
person reasonably assumed to be a pirate refrain from doing any act
208. See id. arts. 49(4), 50(2).
209. See Christoporoff, supra note 202.
210. See Copyright Act, supra note 137, art. 49(4).
211. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 51.
212. See Copyright Act, supra note 137, art. 49(1). The owners of such rights may demand
the following from a violator: (1) the recognition of rights; (2) the restoration to the situation in
which the parties found themselves prior to the infringement and the cessation of acts infring-
ing or threatening to infringe the owners rights; (3) the payment of damages which includes the
benefits the owner has foregone as a result of the infringement; (4) the recovery of any income
the pirate received due to the breach of the owner’s copyrights and related rights (in lieu of a
payment for damages); (5) the payment of a sum between 10,000 and 50,000 times the monthly
Russian minimum wage (in lieu of a payment for damages or recovery of income) at the discre-
tion of the court; and (6) the adoption of other statutory measures which relate to the protec-
tion of the owner’s rights.  See id.
213. See id. art. 49(2).
214. TRIPS allows for a somewhat open-ended payment of damages by an infringer who
“knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in an infringing activity.”  Specifi-
cally, Article 45 provides for “damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder
has suffered. . . .”  TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 45(1).  It also enables courts to require that the
infringer pay attorney’s fees (and possibly even lost profits and/or payment of pre-established
damages) even when the infringer was doing so without knowledge or reason to know.  See id.
art. 45(2)  TRIPS also provides for the disposal of pirated material outside the channels of
commerce to protect the right holder, so long as such activity does not infringe on domestic
constitutional arrangements.  See id. art. 46.
215. See Christoporoff, supra note 202; see also TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 44.
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specified by the Copyright Act—or transporting, storing, or possess-
ing for the release of civil commerce—regarding copies of works and
phonograms assumed to be pirated.216  Courts also have the authority
to require collateral security for civil suits initiated by means of
search for and seizure of copies of works and phonograms which are
assumed to be pirated.217  This is in accordance with TRIPS provisions
regarding injunctions.218
The impact of the current enforcement of the Copyright Act is
slight considering the extraordinarily high piracy rate of seventy-nine
percent in Russia.219  In fact, Russia is reportedly the world’s largest
market for pirated CDs and cassettes.220  Efforts to seize illegal im-
ports are having moderate success, with Russian officials seizing or
preventing from importation over 5.1 million CDs and cassettes in
1997.221  Despite these efforts, and the over two hundred cases filed
against music pirates last year,222 enforcement efforts are having little
effect.  Few have been convicted due to an ineffective judiciary, and
the black market is still booming, with over 500 piracy facilities in
Moscow alone and the Russian government losing an estimated $250
million in taxes to pirates each year.223
In the area of trademarks, one enforcement problem is readily
apparent.  The Trademarks Act states that the Supreme Chamber
will hear disputes falling under Articles 13, 21, 22, 28, 29, 34, and 42
of the Act.224  However, the enabling legislation that actually creates
the Chamber has not been passed.  Moreover, as it currently stands,
an appeal on a trademark ruling to the Chamber of Patent Appeals
(which currently does exist) is handled by the same individuals who
originally heard the case, thus not creating an appeal that is suffi-
ciently independent of the original action.225  Finally, the Russian ju-
216. See Copyright Act, supra note 137, art. 50(1).
217. See id. art. 50(2).
218. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 44.
219. See Smith, supra note 117, at 572.
220. See Tim Obojski, Gorbushka Market, Moscow’s Treasure-Trove of Audio-Video Pi-




224. See Trademarks Act, supra note 147, art. 45(2).
225. See Stewart, supra note 47, at 14 (citing the broad language of Article 10 of the Anti-
Monopoly Act, which prohibits “misleading consumers concerning the character, mode and
place of manufacture, consumer properties, and quality of products.”).
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diciary is poorly versed in trademark litigation.226  This stunts the ap-
peals process for trademark cases and discredits the perceived ability
of the courts to effectively handle such disputes.
There are both criminal and civil sanctions for trademark in-
fringement, but they have been rendered ineffectual to date due to
the government’s inability to enforce decisions.  The State Duma
needs to enact enabling legislation officially establishing the Supreme
Patent Chamber so that trademark owners have a legitimate forum
for dispute resolution.  The provision for damages for infringement
on trademarks is also vague227 and potentially subject to arbitrary en-
forcement by the courts.  Of course, general problems with the Rus-
sian legal tradition abound,228 and enforcement of the law on trade-
marks may take some time to secure.
Another major potential hurdle to effective enforcement of Rus-
sian trademark laws is the provisions for remedies for trademark in-
fringement, which are “extremely general.”229  Certain provisions of
the trademark protection regime are so broadly worded that they
create great potential for misuse.230  TRIPS has been helpful in that it
has provided more specific remedies for right holders, such as apply-
ing for suspension of release of counterfeit trademarked goods,231 and
preventing the re-exportation of counterfeit trademarked goods in an
unaltered state.232  The “simple removal” of a counterfeit trademark
from a good is also not sufficient under TRIPS, other than in excep-
tional cases, to enable the pirated good to be released into the chan-
nels of commerce.233
Regarding geographical indications, the registration of title of
the place of a good’s origin may be declared null and void where it is
226. See id. at 16.
227. The Trademarks Act merely states that illegal use of trademarks “shall entail civil and
criminal liability” and outlines general remedies, such as stopping use, restoring the infringed
party’s reputation, and removing the goods from the channel of commerce.  See Trademarks
Act, supra note 147, art. 46.  Article 30(1) of the Act states the following:
[T]he title of place of origin shall be the title of the country, populated locality, area or
other geographic object (hereinafter “geographic object”) used to denominate goods
whose specific properties are exclusively or mainly determined by the natural condi-
tions or human factors, or natural conditions and human factors simultaneously, as
being characteristic of the given geographic object.
228. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
229. Newcity, supra note 138, at 352.
230. See Stewart, supra note 47, at 14.
231. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 51.
232. See id. art. 59.
233. See id. art. 46.
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in violation of the requirements of the Trademarks Act.234  In addi-
tion, a person may lodge an objection with the Appellate Chamber to
the registration of title of place of goods origin and issue a certificate
of the right to use such title for any of the reasons laid out above. 235
The Trademarks Act also states the following: “Use of a trademark
and the title of the place of goods origin or of denomination similar
to a trademark or title of the place of goods origin for similar goods,
contrary to the provisions [of the Trademarks Act] shall entail civil
and/or criminal liability, under RF law.”236  Courts may also order in-
junctions and allow plaintiffs to recover damages for infringements of
the Trademarks Act.237
It is expected that Russian civil law and other enactments will
specify the available remedies in greater detail.238  In addition to Rus-
sia’s need to implement certain provisions to its Trademarks Act to
comply with the TRIPS Agreement,239 it must more effectively en-
force violations of protection of geographic indications.  While the
Trademarks Act does grant authority to a court to enjoin a party
from acts which violate the indication and may require a party to pay
damages, courts are not effectively enforcing the protection of geo-
graphical indications.  Russia will also have to take measures to fall
234. See Trademarks Act, supra note 147, art. 42(1). More specifically, the legal validity of
the registration of title of the place of a good’s origin may also be terminated upon the
“disappearance of the conditions characteristic of the given geographic object, and impossibil-
ity of making goods with the properties specified in the Register.”  Id. art. 42(2).  The validity
of the registration of the title may also be terminated if the person who owns the title of the
geographic indication loses the right to use the title of goods origin in the country of origin.  See
id.  The validity of the certificate of title may also be declared null and void where it was issued
in breach of the provisions of the Trademarks Act.  See id. art. 42(3). The validity of a certifi-
cate may be terminated if any of the following provisions are met:
[U]pon loss by the goods of the specific properties shown in the Register with respect
to the given title of the place of goods origin; upon cancellation of registration of the
title of the place of goods origin; upon liquidation of a legal person holding the certifi-
cate; on the basis of application of the certificate holder filed with the Patents Office.
Id. art. 42(4).
235. See id. art. 42(5)-(7).
236. Id. art. 46(1).
237. See id. art. 46(2). On the demand of the public body, the procurator, or the holder of a
certificate of right to the use of the title, an individual unlawfully using a registered title of the
place of goods origin or a similar denomination must: (1) stop the use thereof; (2) indemnify
damages caused to all aggrieved persons; (3) pay into the revenue of local budget the profit
received from such actions (in excess of the indemnified damages); (4) publish a court order to
restore the other party’s damaged business reputation; and (5) remove from the goods or pack-
aging the unlawfully used title or similar denomination, or destroy depictions of the title.  See
id. art. 46(3).
238. See Newcity, supra note 138, at 350.
239. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.b.
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into compliance with the enforcement and arbitration procedures
outlined in Articles 41-43 and 34.
Aside from the problems previously discussed,240 no significant
problems with industrial designs currently exist, although the Russian
law might need to be clarified in order to conform with TRIPS.  Un-
der the Patents Act, an industrial design is protected if it is (1) novel,
(2) original, and (3) industrially applicable.241  The confusing standard
of “independently created” under TRIPS may only serve to reem-
phasize that no imitations are to be allowed under this category, but
its interpretation in the Russian context is unclear as of yet.  If a pat-
ent for an industrial design was issued to the author’s employer, the
author has the right to receive compensation for the design on the
basis of either an agreement between the employer or as provided in
the U.S.S.R. Inventions Act and the U.S.S.R. Industrial Design
Act.242  Patents for industrial designs extend for ten years from the
date of filing and may be extended for another five years,243 which is
consistent with TRIPS.
It is currently unclear whether the remedies provided under
Russian law will prove adequate for rightholders.  Authors of inte-
grated circuit layouts (and other rightful holders under Article 1(2) of
the Integrated Circuit Act) may appeal to the court system for
recognition of rights, restoration of status quo prior to infringe-
ment . . . , recovery of damages, . . . [an additional] fine amounting
to 10 percent of the sum awarded by a court in favor of the plaintiff,
to be entered into the revenue of the RF budget, [or] adoption of
other statutory measures pertaining to protection of author’s
rights.244
The only specific remedies outlined, however, benefit the Rus-
sian government and not the aggrieved party, although the Act does
also allow for confiscation not only of fabricated copies of illegal in-
tegrated circuits but also of all the materials and equipment used to
fabricate the circuits, the proceeds of which may go to the plaintiff.245
240. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.d.
241. Patents Act, supra note 168, art. 6(1); see also Baev, supra note 169, at 365.  For regu-
lations regarding the licensing of industrial designs, see Rules for Consideration and Registra-
tion of Agreements on Cession of Patent and License Agreements on Granting the Rights to
Use Invention, Utility Model or Industrial Design (Rospatent Order), Registered with the RF
Ministry of Justice under No. 853 on May 12, 1995, Apr. 21, 1995.
242. See Application on RF Territory of some Provisions of ex-U.S.S.R. Legislation on In-
ventions and Industrial Design, RF Government Decree No. 822, Aug. 14, 1993, art. 3.
243. See Patents Act, supra note 168, art. 3(3).
244. Integrated Circuit Act, supra note 175, art. 11(1).
245. See id. art. 11(3).
MCBROAD8.MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:59 PM
1998] TRIPS AND RUSSIAN ACCESSION TO THE WTO 553
With patents there is the recurring problem of judicial enforce-
ment, as Article 32 of TRIPS provides that judicial review must be
available to anyone whose patent has been revoked or forfeited.246
As the Russian government has not yet actually instituted the Su-
preme Patent Chamber, an individual’s right to judicial review, much
less his or her right to judicial enforcement of a decision, lies in un-
certain territory.  In terms of compliance with TRIPS, aside from the
aforementioned general problems, there is no major conflict between
the Russian law on integrated circuits and TRIPS, as they mirror
each other.247
Regarding the protection of undisclosed information, the infor-
mation constituting an employment or commercial secret is protected
by the Russian Civil Code, the general protection of the trademark
laws, and other laws.  The Civil Code requires individuals who have
received any information which constitutes an employment or com-
mercial secret by illegal methods to compensate the owner for losses
caused by the receipt of such information.248  In addition, the Civil
Code also provides the following: “[t]he same duty shall be placed on
workers who, contrary to the labour contract, have divulged an em-
ployment or commercial secret, including a kontrakt, or contracting
parties who have done so despite a civil-law contract.”249
Articles 8 through 16 of the Civil Code also provide more
broadly-structured remedial provisions.  Article 8(1) specifically
notes that civil rights shall arise “as a result of the creation of works
of science, literature, art, inventions, and other results of intellectual
activity.”250  If a right to property must be registered with the State,
the civil right shall arise at the moment that the property is regis-
tered, unless established otherwise by law.251
Articles 9 and 10 provide for the effectuation and limitations of
civil rights.  Article 9 states that citizens and juridical persons may ef-
fectuate the civil rights (that belong to them) at their discretion,252
and that, except for instances provided for by a law, these rights may
not be terminated if citizens and juridical persons refuse to effectuate
246. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 32.
247. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.f.
248. See Civil Code of the Russian Federation, art. 139(2).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id. art. 8(2).
252. See id. art. 9(1).
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their civil rights.253  Article 10, however, provides for limitations on
the civil rights granted by the Civil Code in situations where the
rights are used to harm others or to limit competition.254
Articles 11 and 12 contain the provisions for the defense of civil
rights.  Article 11 provides that a “court, arbitrazh court, or arbitra-
tion court . . . shall effectuate the defence of violated or contested
civil rights in accordance with the jurisdiction of cases established by
procedural legislation.”255  Article 11 also provides for the defense of
civil rights in an administrative procedure, but states that a defense
may be effectuated in this procedure only in the instances provided
for by law.256  Article 12 provides for the means of a defense of civil
rights, stating that such rights shall be defended in the following
ways:
[R]ecognition of the right; restoration of the situation which existed
before the violation of the right and suppressing actions violating a
right or creating a threat to violate it; recognition of a contested
transaction to be invalid and the application of the consequences of
the invalidity thereof, and the application of the consequences of
the invalidity of a null transaction; recognition of an act of a State
agency or agency of local self-government to be invalid; self-
defence of right; awarding performance of a duty in kind; compen-
sation of losses; recovery of a penalty; contributory compensation
for moral harm; termination or change of legal relation; non-
application by count of act of a State agency or agency of local self-
government which is contrary to a law; [and] other means provided
for by a law.
Article 13 provides a defense of civil rights when they are vio-
lated by a government act, while Article 14 allows the self-defense of
civil rights.  Article 13 allows a court to declare invalid both norma-
tive and non-normative acts of a State agency or an agency of local
self-government that violate the civil interests of a citizen or a juridi-
cal person protected under the law.  If a court does invalidate the act
of a State agency or agency of a local self-government, the violated
right is subject to restoration or to Article 12 defenses.257  Article 14
permits the self-defense of civil rights, but limits such defense to
means that are commensurate to the violation, and may not exceed
the limits of actions necessary to it.
253. See id. art. 9(2).
254. See id. art. 10(1)-(3).
255. Id. art. 11(1).
256. See id. art. 11(2).
257. See id. art. 13.
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Articles 15 and 16 address the compensation of losses.  Article
15(1) states the following: “A person whose right has been violated
may demand full compensation of losses caused to him unless com-
pensation of losses in a lesser amount has been provided for by a law
or contract.” Article 15(2) further elaborates upon the provisions in
paragraph one, by defining “losses” as  the following:
[E]xpenses which the person whose rights have been violated made
or must make in order to restore the violated right, loss or damage
of his property (real damage), and also revenues not received which
this person would have received under ordinary conditions of civil
turnover if his right had not been violated (lost advantage).
Furthermore, if the individual or entity that has violated the civil
rights has received revenues as a consequence thereof, the individual
whose rights were violated may demand compensation—in addition
to the other losses—for lost advantage in an amount equal to or
greater than the revenues.258  Article 16 deals with the compensation
for losses caused by State agencies and agencies of local self-
government.  Article 16 states the following:
Losses caused to a citizen or juridical person as a result of the ille-
gal actions (or failure to act) of State agencies, agencies of local
self-government, or officials of these agencies, including the publi-
cation of the act of a State agency or agency of local self-
government which does not correspond to a law or other legal act,
shall be subject to compensation by the Russian Federation, respec-
tive subject of the Russian Federation, or municipal formation.259
In addition to the remedies provided by the Civil Code in de-
fense of undisclosed information, the Anti-Monopoly Law contains
provisions regarding the liability incurred by breaching anti-
monopoly legislation.260  Articles 22 and 22-1 of the Anti-Monopoly
Law delineate these remedial provisions.
Article 22 provides that if commercial and noncommercial or-
ganizations, federal organs of executive power, organs or executive
power of Russian subjects, organs of local self-government, or citi-
zens breach antimonopoly legislation, they are bound by directive
guidelines of the Federal Antimonopoly Agency.261  According to
Agency directives, if the listed entities or individuals breach the an-
timonopoly legislation, they are bound to do the following:
[T]o discontinue the breach, to restore the status quo, to rescind the
258. See id. art. 15(2).
259. Id. art. 16.
260. See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 156, § 5.
261. See id. art. 22(1).
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contract or make amendments thereto, to conclude a contract with
another business subject, to revoke the act not in conformity with
legislation, to remit into the federal budget the profits received as a
result of the breach, to effect reorganization in the form of division
or divestiture, with observance of the established conditions and
time periods, and to perform other actions specified in the direc-
tive.262
In addition, in the event of a breach, the Federal Antimonopoly
Agency may impose fines and issue warnings in administrative pro-
cedure.263
Article 22-1 outlines the types of liability for a breach of antimo-
nopoly legislation.  Article 22-1 provides that government officials,
commercial and noncommercial organizations and their senior execu-
tives, and citizens shall bear civil, administrative, or criminal liability
for willful illegal acts in breach of antimonopoly legislation.
Russia does not have an enforcement problem with control of
anti-competitive practices in contract licensing because they are al-
lowed to use domestic law to deal with it.  The only thing they have
to do to comply with TRIPS is provide a consultation procedure,
which apparently does not involve any enforcement issues.
Despite the existence of these remedies on paper, many factors
render such options effectively unavailable.  Some specific provisions
of enforcement may be lacking.  However, this is not the central
problem.  While Russia has adopted many laws regarding enforce-
ment, the problem lies in the long tradition of piracy and lack of
knowledge in the judiciary, not in the lack of available remedies.  A
major difficulty individuals face when they wish to file a court action
against someone is that “the role, status and organization of courts
remains as uncertain as the substance of the laws that they adjudi-
cate.”264  Numerous problems still exist with judicial selection, judicial
independence, and public perception of the validity of the judicial
system as a whole.265  Individuals will not pay the potentially high
court costs involved in litigating an intellectual property dispute if the
judgment to be rendered is possibly arbitrary or corrupt, and proba-
bly ultimately unenforceable.  A corrupt Duma is also helping little
262. Id. art. 22(1).
263. See id. art. 22(2).
264. Peter H. Solomon, The Limits of Legal Order in Post-Soviet Russia, 11 POST-SOVIET
AFFAIRS 89, 94 (1995).
265. As many as sixty percent of the Russian population have voiced their distrust in the
courts.  See id. at 106-07.
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to create a sense of legitimacy in the Russian legal system.266  The
proliferation of organized crime since the fall of the Soviet Union267
has also hampered efforts to enforce intellectual property rights.
C.  The Russian Legal Tradition
[T]he law is no more than a dwarf on the shoulders of a giant—a so-
ciety with its culture, religion, traditions, ideology . . . [t]he dwarf is
helpless outside or beside society. . . .268
The problems attendant to enforcing laws are not confined to the
area of intellectual property rights.  Crucial to a legitimate analysis of
Russian intellectual property law is an exploration of the underlying
legal traditions on which Russian law is built.  The Russian legal tra-
dition has created a legal culture (or lack thereof) that is distrustful
of the law and in which law is not taken seriously at best and, at
worst, is flagrantly disregarded.  This “apparent failure of Russian so-
ciety to attach any opprobrium to . . . breaches of the law”269 stems
from a number of factors, including cynicism about the capability of
legal institutions to regulate various spheres of activity, poorly-
drafted and often vague or inconsistent legislation, corrupt political
officials, and decades of a communist rule that subordinated legal in-
stitutions for political gains.270
How did this attitude develop?  Alexander Yakovlev, a leading
Russian legal scholar who has played an important role in legal re-
forms in post-Soviet Russia,271 cites three underlying influences cen-
tral to the development of Russian legal culture: (1) Russia’s cultural
266. See id.
267. See id. at 108.
268. ALEXANDER M. YAKOVLEV, STRIVING FOR LAW IN A LAWLESS LAND 7 (1996).
269. Michael Newcity, Russian Legal Tradition and the Rule of Law, in JEFFREY D. SACHS
AND KATHARINA PISTOR, THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 41, 42
(1997).  Newcity cites four general reasons why the Russian legal tradition has been historically
different than the Western legal tradition in its disrespect for the law: (1) “[t]he influence of
Russian Orthodoxy on the development of Russian legal consciousness”; (2) “[a] tradition of
absolutism that has been virtually uninterrupted since the sixteenth century”; (3) “[d]elayed
economic development in Russia, with the persistence of a traditional peasant culture that em-
phasized the communal ownership of land well into the twentieth century”; and (4) “75 years of
a communist regime that emphasized as a matter of theory that law was superstructure, that as
a matter of constitutional principle raised the CPSU above constitutional limitations, and that
practiced a highly politicized and increasingly corrupt brand of law.”  Id. at 46; see also Thomas
C. Owen, Autocracy and the Rule of Law in Russian Economic History, in JEFFREY D. SACHS
AND KATHARINA PISTOR, THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 23-39
(1997).
270. See Newcity, supra note 269, at 42-44.
271. See YAKOVLEV, supra note 268, at xiii.
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traditions, (2) Marx’s theory of state and law, and (3) the Russian
version of absolute monarchy.272
First, Russia’s cultural traditions have weighed heavily on the le-
gitimacy given to legal institutions in modern-day Russia.  A dialectic
between “moral” truth (pravda) and “objective” truth (istina) exists
in Russian culture: “Istina necessarily is, while pravda is something
that ought to be. . . .  In the Russian people’s consciousness, the law
has never been associated with moral truth.”273  This is distinguished
from the Western legal tradition, where moral and objective truth ar-
guably meld together into an organic, independent Rule of Law that
can be used “not only as a sword available exclusively to the regime,
but also as a shield with which [the non-powerful] can protect and
advance their own interests against other citizens and even against
the state.”274  In Russia, by contrast, the law was seen as a tool of po-
litical elites that was to be wielded against the weak:
The Soviet legal culture was the antithesis of a legal culture
grounded in the rule of law.  While the trappings of a legal system
were present in the form of the courts, as well as an extensive body
of positive law, something vital was missing.  Soviet law lacked the
legitimacy that exists when law reflects the values of the community
at large.  Law was a force imposed from above by the state; legal
institutions were avoided at all costs.275
Given that the law was perceived as what was, as opposed to an
ideal of what should be, it is no surprise that “moral” truth was le-
gitimized by placing it above the law (“objective” truth) when con-
science dictated.276
Second, Marx’s theory of law and the state left an equally indeli-
ble mark on Russian legal culture.  In short, Marx’s theory on law
and the state sanctified the following principles:
(1) Law is separate from society and tied up in the state.  It is pri-
marily a projection of the will of the dominant class and is not a set
272. See id. at 7-25.
273. Id. at 9-10.
274. Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian Legal Culture, 5
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 41 (1995).
275. Id.
276. Yakovlev summarizes the dualistic existence of truth as follows:
In a situation where the law is equated only with the power of a tyrannical state,
where the law is not respected but only feared, the idea of fairness is contrasted to ex-
isting laws.  There the ways of morals and conscience are considered to be the only
ways possible for a moral and fair people, while the law is considered to be of limited
significance, a body of merely “external” norms.  “Internal,” spiritual, moral freedom
is pictured as the highest value, the only one worth achieving.
YAKOVLEV, supra note 268, at 13.
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of objectively existing, orderly structured social relations. . . .
(2) In a society supposedly split into irreconcilable, antagonistic
classes, the state and law are nothing but tools for oppression, a
projection of the interests of the dominant social class.
(3) The oppressed class, the proletariat, is the bearer of absolute
truth, the liberator of humankind, and the creator of an ideal world
of the highest justice, without state or law.
(4) To create this perfect world the proletariat must destroy the state
and law and negate them as tools of oppression.
(5) Any product of liberal thinking in the theory of the state and
law, such as the rule of law . . . is to be treated contemptuously as
the product of false consciousness, as an ideological cover-up serv-
ing the interests of the dominant class.
(6) A “dictatorship of the proletariat” is the ideal tool to build a
utopian society with absolute justice.  Toward this end any means
[including violence] is justified.277
Obviously, the existence of these ideas in Russian culture for
decades was not kind to the development of a legal system in which
the law was respected or perceived as an objective shield and sword
for the oppressed as well as the privileged to use.
Third, the uniquely Russian construct of absolute monarchy that
existed in pre-revolutionary Russia placed all conceivable political
power in the hands of a single absolute monarch (samoderzhavnyi),
who had total control over the entire legal system and enshrined a
wholesale rejection of the contractual nature of the state.278
These three factors have had what some argue is an intractable
effect on the development of a Russian legal culture—an influence
that may be almost impossible to overcome in the quest to establish a
respected rule of law in the post-Soviet regime.  In sum, “[i]n the ab-
sence of either effective coercive power by the state, a strongly held
moral norm that motivates compliance, or a pervasive sense of le-
gitimacy, Russians often see no particular reason why they ought to
obey the law.”279  Even if the political and economic environment in
Russia stabilizes, it is possible that a stable legal system may not be a
byproduct of that process.280
This is not to say that no positive legal developments have oc-
277. Id. at 19.
278. See id. at 20-24.
279. Newcity, supra note 269, at 44.
280. See, e.g., Hendley, supra note 274, at 63 (arguing that managers in the commercial con-
tracts context “desperately want stability—they want to be able to plan for the future, but they
do not see law as a means to that end.”).
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curred since the fall of the Soviet empire.  The Russian government
has taken positive steps in at least getting the law “on the books,” an
important first step in establishing a legitimate legal system.  A posi-
tive political initiative also existed between U.S. Vice President Al
Gore and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin which cre-
ated one avenue through which some enforcement issues may have
been worked out.  The two leaders had been meeting on a regular ba-
sis for the last five years, and a number of agreements were reached
through this initiative, including a special unit that Chernomyrdin es-
tablished in the Interior Department to focus on piracy, as well as
other agreements.281  Some concerned U.S. industry leaders, such as
Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of Amer-
ica, have also met with Chernomyrdin in efforts to improve the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights in Russia.282
Many hoped that the Gore-Chernomyrdin initiative would be
the starting point for development of a positivist legal culture.  How-
ever, these developments may have been effectively destroyed when
Yeltsin dismissed his entire cabinet in March of this year.283  In the af-
termath of Chernomyrdin’s dismissal and uncertainty about who will
fill the empty Prime Minister post, the value of this dialogue now be-
comes questionable.284
281. See Christopher Stern, The Minsk C’right Menace, VARIETY (daily ed.), Oct. 8, 1997,
at 1; see also Elizabeth Shogren, Gore Leads Russian Premier on a Silicon Valley Stroll, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at A12; Al, Viktor and the Mosowrena, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 34.
282. Such meetings were apparently producing positive results.  See Olga Svistunova and
Igor Veksler, Jack Valenti satisfied with his meeting with Chernomyrdin, ITAR-TASS News
Agency, July 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Stern, supra note 281.
According to Valenti, pirates control almost one hundred percent of the home video market in
Russia.  Id.
283. See William Safire, You’re All Fired!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at A27 (quoting Al-
exandr Lebed as saying, “take Prime Minister from Chernomyrdin, and he’s nothing.”); Philip
Shenon, U.S. Ties Unaffected, Russian Tells Albright, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at A8; Mi-
chael Specter, Shake-up in Russia: The Overview; Yeltsin Dismisses His Entire Cabinet in Show
of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A1; Tim Wiener, Shake-up in Russia: The Reaction;
Washington Listened, but Moscow Didn’t Call, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A8.
284. One factor to consider, however, is the fact that both Gore and Chernomyrdin will be
running for president in their respective countries in the next presidential elections.  Unfortu-
nately for Chernomyrdin, however, according to recent polls less than ten percent of the Rus-
sian public would vote for him.  See Michael R. Gordon, Ex-Premier of Russia Plans to Run for
President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at § 1, p. 9 (reporting that in an Izvestia poll “only 5.4
percent of those surveyed supported Mr. Chernomyrdin for President); Al, Viktor and the
Mosowrena, supra note 281 (stating that Chernomyrdin’s support in the polls had sunk to ten
percent).  President Yeltsin will not be running for re-election in 2000.  See Michael R. Gordon,
Yeltsin Says He Won’t Run For Another Term in 2000, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at A6.
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V.  CONCLUSION
Russia most certainly would not have been accepted to full
WTO membership at the signing of the WTO agreements in 1995.
Fortunately, the agreements provide for a transitional period of five
years for developing countries and for countries, like Russia, who are
making the transition from a centrally-planned to a market econ-
omy.285  This transition period, however, is not automatic.  Three fac-
tors must be fulfilled before the WTO will grant such a transition pe-
riod: (1) the country must be in the process of transforming from a
centrally-planned to a market economy, (2) the country must be un-
dertaking structural reform of its intellectual property system, and
(3) the country must demonstrate that it faces special problems in the
preparation and implementation of intellectual property laws and
regulations.286  Article 65 of TRIPS does grant an additional five-year
grace period for patents in pharmaceuticals or agricultural products
that are not currently protected under Russian law.287  However,
during this period Russia may not allow its domestic legal regime to
become more inconsistent with TRIPS (the “non-backsliding”
clause).288  The transition period does not give a country a “way out”
of international obligations (such as the Paris and Berne Conven-
tions) to which it has already committed itself.
Russia is effectively in this grace period now, and must be in full
compliance with the WTO agreements by the time its bid for mem-
bership comes up in 2000.  Moreover, the TRIPS text, after it was
signed into force, acquired the status of a “de facto set of interna-
tional norms,”289 which creates an informal body of international law
on which nations may rely in international litigation of intellectual
property disputes.  In sum, “the general rule is that obligations in the
agreement apply to intellectual property rights that exist at the end of
a country’s transition period, as well as to new ones.”290  Although
many view the Russian legal regime as “a moving target” that ham-
pers Russia’s chances of becoming a full WTO Member,291 Russia has
285. See TRIPS, supra note 66, art. 65(2)-(3).
286. See id.
287. See id. art. 65(4).  This provision involves a system whereby a patent that is filed after
the WTO agreements were signed is held until such patents are granted and/or protected, but
when examined will be examined as it was at the time of the filing.  See id.
288. Id. art. 65(5).
289. Otten and Wager, supra note 1, at 408.
290. Transition Arrangements: 1, 5 or 11 Years to Fall into Line (visited Nov. 10, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/agmnts6.htm>.
291. Stephanie Baker-Said, WTO Says Russia Must Stabilize Laws, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18,
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made much progress in aligning its intellectual property regime with
international standards.  The most formidable obstacle in Russia’s
path to the WTO is the Russian government’s current inability to en-
force the laws that already exist.  The difficulty in surmounting such a
challenge is particularly acute in Russia, given its cultural penchant
for distrusting the government and its institutions.  However, Rus-
sia’s best chance for acceding to the WTO will come as the Russian
economic and legal systems slowly stabilize and provide an opportu-
nity for its intellectual property regime to root and flourish.
Christian L. Broadbent
Amanda M. McMillian
1997, at A16.
